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ARTICLES
CAN A CATHOLIC LAWYER REPRESENT A
MINOR SEEKING A JUDICIAL BYPASS FOR
AN ABORTION? A MORAL AND CANON
LAW ANALYSIS
LARRY CUNNINGHAM t
INTRODUCTION
Catholic lawyers are uniquely positioned to appreciate the
existence of conflicts between religion, morality, and professional
obligation. Catholic teaching holds that it is not possible to
separate one's existence into different identities-Catholic and
lawyer, for example-allotting different moral rules and
standards to each role.1 One's conscience is inseparable and
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See CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE OF THE FAITH, DOCTRINAL NOTE ON
SOME QUESTIONS REGARDING THE PARTICIPATION OF CATHOLICS IN POLITICAL LIFE
6 (2003) [hereinafter CDF].
It is a question of the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent, found
within one's conscience, which is one and indivisible. "There cannot be two
parallel lives in their existence: on the one hand, the so-called 'spiritual
life', with its values and demands; and on the other, the so-called 'secular'
life, that is, life in a family, at work, in social responsibilities, in the
responsibilities of public life and in culture .. "
Id. (quoting John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles Laici 59 (Dec. 30,
1988)).
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guides all aspects of one's life.2 There are certain fundamental
beliefs that are central to Catholicism and that impact all daily
decisions; one of them, for example, is the belief that life, at all
stages, is to be respected and protected.3 Flowing from this
respect for human life, in turn, is the unequivocal, Catholic
opposition to abortion.4
In certain states, a minor who wishes to obtain an abortion
must first get the consent of her parents or at least notify them of
her intentions.5 The Supreme Court has held that the abortion
decision cannot be subject to the veto of a third party, such as a
parent.6 Accordingly, states with parental notification or consent
statutes must afford minors a "judicial bypass"-a confidential,
ex parte proceeding in which the minor is afforded an
opportunity to convince a judge that she is either mature enough
to make the decision to get an abortion or that an abortion is in
her best interests.7 In some states that have judicial bypass
procedures, minors are afforded the right to court-appointed
counsel. 8
2 See id. § 2, 2, 3 ("If Christians must 'recognize the legitimacy of differing
points of view about the organization of worldly affairs', they are also called to reject,
as injurious to democratic life, a conception of pluralism that reflects moral
relativism.") (citation omitted).
3 See CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2270, at 547 (2d ed. 1997)
("Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of
conception.").
4 See JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL LETTER EVANGELIUM VITAE 58 (1995)
[hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE] ("Among all the crimes which can be committed
against life, procured abortion has characteristics making it particularly serious and
deplorable. The Second Vatican Council defines abortion.. . as an 'unspeakable
crime.' ").
' See generally William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Validity, Construction, and
Application of Statutes Requiring Parental Notification of or Consent to Minor's
Abortion, 77 A.L.R.5TH 1 (2000) (discussing parental notification and parental
consent statutes).
6 See id. at 33 ("[T]he state does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of a physician
and his or her patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the reason
for withholding the consent."); see also Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
7 See Danne, Jr., supra note 5, at 21-27 (discussing the constitutional
requirements of judicial bypass provisions).
8 See id. at 146 ("[Several courts have] held that it is a prerequisite to the
validity of the judicial bypass procedure of a state statute requiring parental consent
to or notification of a minor's abortion that it provide for the appointment of counsel
for the minor.").
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Enter now the Catholic lawyer. Can he or she assist a minor
in obtaining a judicial bypass? There are two ways in which the
lawyer's actions can be analyzed. Under the Code of Canon Law,
does the lawyer incur a canonical penalty, such as
excommunication, by providing this professional assistance to the
minor? Second, even if the lawyer is not subject to a delict, is the
lawyer's assistance nevertheless so at odds with Catholic
theology such that he should, as a matter of conscience, decline
the case?
I will begin this article in Part I with an analysis of the
context of the dilemma: the law of access to abortions by minors
and the judicial bypass procedures that are in place in many
states. In Part II, I will examine the canonical implications of a
lawyer's representation of a minor in a judicial bypass case. In
Part III, I will attempt to resolve the moral conflict between, on
the one hand, helping those in need, and, on the other hand, the
strict Catholic teaching against abortion.
I. JUDICIAL BYPASSES
The landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Roe v. Wade
9
recognized a woman's constitutional right to have an abortion."
The Court derived its holding from a finding that the
Constitution implicitly recognizes a right to personal privacy."
The Roe Court, however, declined to find that the right to privacy
affords a woman an absolute right to terminate her pregnancy.
1 2
A state may regulate the abortion decision where there is a
"compelling state interest" and the regulation is "narrowly drawn
to express only the legitimate state interests at stake."'
' 3
After Roe, some states enacted laws regulating the ability of
minors to obtain abortions.1 4 These laws fell into two general
categories. Some states prohibited a physician from performing
an abortion on a minor unless the minor's parents first gave their
9 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
10 See id. at 154.
See id. at 152.
12 See id. at 153.
13 See id. at 155.
14 See generally Danne, Jr., supra note 5; Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights:
The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 589 (2002).
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consent. 5 A second group of states required physicians to inform
or notify parents of their child's desire to have an abortion. 16
These laws were challenged in two principal, post-Roe
Supreme Court decisions. The first, Planned Parenthood of
Central Missouri v. Danforth,7 involved a challenge to a Missouri
law that required "the written consent of one parent or person in
loco parentis of the woman if the woman is unmarried and under
the age of eighteen years, unless the abortion is certified by a
licensed physician as necessary in order to preserve the life of the
mother."' 8  The Supreme Court found that this statute was
unconstitutional because it gave third-parties-namely, the
juvenile's parents-a veto power over the abortion decision.' 9
The Court's rationale for this rule of law flowed directly from its
pronouncements in Roe that the abortion decision is a
fundamental right.2"
The Supreme Court provided some measure of guidance to
states in the area of regulation of minors' access to abortion-on-
demand in Bellotti v. Baird.El In Bellotti, the Court heard a
challenge to a Massachusetts statute that provided that a child
under the age of eighteen could only obtain an abortion if she
obtained the consent of both parents.22 If one or both parents
refused to give consent, a minor could seek consent from a
judge.23 The Court reaffirmed its holding in Danforth that a
state cannot give an absolute veto power over the abortion
decision to a third-party and, on this basis, found the
Massachusetts statute unconstitutional.24
1" See Danne, Jr., supra note 5, § 5[a], at 47-51 (discussing state statutes
requiring parental consent before a minor can obtain an abortion).
16 See id. at 53 (discussing state statutes requiring parental notification before a
minor can obtain an abortion).
17 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
18 See id. app. at 85 (appending H. B. 1211, 77th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess.
(Mo. 1974)).
'9 See id. at 74 ("[T]he State does not have the constitutional authority to give a
third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the decision of the
physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy, regardless of the
reason for withholding the consent.").
20 See Danne, Jr., supra note 5, § 6[a], at 56.
21 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (4-4 decision).
22 See id. at 625.
23 See id.
24 See id. at 643, 651 (confirming that "the unique nature and consequences of
the abortion decision" make giving absolute discretion over the abortion decision to a
third-party improper).
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The Bellotti Court split 4-4, however, on whether a properly
drawn judicial bypass statute would be constitutional." Justice
Powell and three other members of the Court declared that a
statute requiring the consent of one or more parents would be
constitutional if it provided a bypass mechanism that enabled the
minor to seek a neutral determination of whether she could have
the abortion.26 Justice Stevens, writing for himself and three
other members of the Court, stated that giving a judge the power
to overrule a minor's abortion decision was just as problematic as
giving that power to a parent because it would be just as
burdensome to the minor and just as arbitrary a decision for a
judge.2 7
Justice Powell's plurality decision is widely considered the
law on the subject of parental consent and notification statutes.2 8
The Powell plurality stated that a consent statute would be
constitutional if it provided a bypass mechanism 29 that enabled a
minor "to show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well
enough informed to make her abortion decision, in consultation
with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2)
that even if she is not able to make this decision independently,
the desired abortion would be in her best interests."3 ° The bypass
25 A plurality of the Court found that Massachusetts' judicial bypass provision
was not sufficient because "it require[d] parental consultation or notification in
every instance." See id. at 651 (Powell, J.).
26 See id. at 643 (concluding that a statute must afford an "alternative
procedure" by which the minor could obtain authorization).
27 See id. at 655-56 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the burden placed on the
minor to commence judicial proceedings and the difficulty judges will have in
discerning the best interests of the minor).
28 See Danne, Jr., supra note 5, § 3, at 34 (describing a case which held that
parental consent statutes must include an "adequate procedure for judicially
bypassing the parental consent requirement"). Courts have consistently upheld the
principle that a state cannot make parental consent "so inflexible a prerequisite to a
minor's right to obtain an abortion that the minor's parent or parents have an
absolute veto power over her decision." Id. at 31. Both federal and state courts have
recognized that state legislation requiring parental consent for a minor's abortion
can meet federal constitutional standards only if it provides an alternative
procedure, generally termed a "bypass option," whereby a qualified minor can show
that she should be granted authorization for the abortion even absent parental
consent. See id. at 31-35 (listing cases where courts have required an alternative
judicial bypass procedure).
29 Justice Powell opined that the bypass mechanism need not be judicial. See
Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 643 n.22 (describing forums other than a court of general
jurisdiction that could provide the alternative procedure).
30 See id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted); see also Danne, Jr., supra note 5, §§ 14-
15 (discussing and citing decisions that have considered a minor's maturity and
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procedure must be quick, anonymous, and not require pre-
notification or consent of one's parents.' Some courts have held
that a minor is entitled to appointed counsel in judicial bypass
proceedings.32 In some jurisdictions, there is a list of attorneys
willing to be appointed to such cases.33
II. ANALYSIS UNDER CANON LAW
The Code of Canon Law contains the internal operating
procedures of the Catholic Church,34 regulating the "order and
discipline" of its members.35 Canon 1398 imposes an automatic
excommunication upon any Catholic who procures a completed
abortion.3 6  In this section, I will address whether a Catholic
lawyer who represents a minor in a judicial bypass proceeding
incurs this penalty.
A preliminary word on penalties in canon law is in order.
"While the Church is a graced community empowered by the
Spirit, its members are sinners reflecting the limitations of the
decisions that have evaluated a minor's best interests). It is unclear whether mere
parental notification statutes must also provide a bypass mechanism. The Supreme
Court "has repeatedly emphasized that it has not decided whether such a bypass
option is constitutionally required in a parental notification measure." See id. §
11[a], at 93; see also id. § 12, at 100 (suggesting "there can be no constitutional
objection to a parental notification statute having a bypass option that would meet
constitutional standards if included in a parental consent statute"). A plurality of
the Bellotti Court found Massachusetts' parental consent statute to be
unconstitutional, notwithstanding its judicial bypass provision, because the statute
required parental notification in all instances. See id. § 11[a], at 93. In some cases,
courts have required a judicial bypass mechanism even with notification. See id. §
11[b], at 94. Other cases have held the opposite. See id. § 11[c], at 97-98.
31 See Bellotti, 443 U.S. at 644; see also Danne, Jr., supra note 5, § 17, at 131-
145 (citing and discussing cases relevant to preserving a minor's anonymity).
32 See Danne, Jr., supra note 5, § 19[a], at 146-47 (detailing cases that required
the appointment of counsel). But see id. § 19[b], at 147-49 (describing cases that did
not require the appointment of counsel).
33 See, e.g., Jane's Due Process, http://www.janesdueprocess.org (last visited Oct.
21, 2005) (maintaining a network of attorneys in Texas willing to accept referrals for
judicial bypass cases).
34 The Code only applies to the Latin Church. See NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW c. 1 (John P. Beal, James A. Coriden, & Thomas J. Green eds.,
2000) [hereinafter NEW COMMENTARY]. Note that text of canons reprinted in NEW
COMMENTARY is taken from CODE OF CANON LAW, LATIN-ENGLISH EDITION (1998).
" See JAMES A. CORIDEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CANON LAW 4 (rev. ed. 2004).
36 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1398, at 1602 ("A person who
procures a completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.").
2005] SEEKING A JUDICIAL BYPASS FOR AN ABORTION 385
human condition."37 Punishment serves two principal purposes:
to reform the individual and to repair the serious harm done to
the community by the ecclesiastical offense.38 Punishment is a
last resort-an unfortunate consequence of the failure of informal
and rehabilitative kinds of intervention.39  Discussion,
counseling, and informal reprimand are all preferred means to
deal with a Catholic who has violated a norm or canon.4" This is
provided for in Canon 1341: "An ordinary is to take care to
initiate a judicial or administrative process to impose or declare
penalties only after he has ascertained that fraternal correction
or rebuke or other means of pastoral solicitude cannot
sufficiently repair the scandal, restore justice, reform the
offender."41
Every penal offense has three elements.42 First, there must
be an external violation-that is, matters of internal conscience
are not proper subjects of penal sanctions.43 Second, the conduct
3' Thomas J. Green, Introduction to NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 1529.
Father Coriden expressed the view that "the church is also a human community
made up of ornery, erring, and sinful people." CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 5.
38 See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183 (listing the two purposes of punishment);
Green, supra note 37, at 1529. The Code itself provides: "The Church has the innate
and proper right to coerce offending members of the Christian faithful with penal
sanctions." NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1311, at 1533. This principle exists
to protect the community of the faithful, who joined the Church with certain
expectations as to common beliefs and practices. See Green, supra note 37, at 1530
("While some types of diversity (e.g., theological, canonical, ascetical, liturgical)
clearly enrich the Church, it cannot tolerate divergent patterns of thought and
activity if it is to be faithful to its teaching, sanctifying, and serving mission.").
39 See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183 (listing methods to be used prior to
punishment); Green, supra note 37, at 1532 ("A renewed recognition of human
dignity and freedom and of the salvific character of church law underlies the code's
forceful emphasis on penalties only as a last resort when all other legal-pastoral
measures have failed to deal with problematic behavior.").
40 See James A. Coriden, Church Law and Abortion, 33 JURIST 184, 195-97
(1973) (arguing that ipso facto excommunication is often too harsh of a penalty for
the crime of abortion). For an example of a bishop's attempts at reform prior to the
imposition of a canonical penalty, see Rene Henry Gracida, Denying Holy
Communion: A Case History, CATHOLIC ExCHANGE, Dec. 20, 2004,
http://www.catholicexchange.com/vm/index.asp?vmid=2&art id=26216.
41 NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1341, at 1558.
42 See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183.
41 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1321 § 1, at 1540 ("No one is
punished unless [there is an] external violation of a law or a precept .... ); see also
CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183-84 (explaining that an external violation must be
"not something that is solely in the world of intentions or in the forum of
conscience"). Thus, a person cannot be punished for a mere intention or belief. See
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must be "gravely imputable" because of intent or "culpable
negligence." 4  In contrast to American criminal law,45 ignorance
of the law is a defense to a canonical penalty.4 6 In the case of
automatic censure, the delinquent must know about the
censure-not just the crime.47 Third, the violation must be of a
law to which a penalty has been attached.48
There are essentially two types of punishments that can be
imposed under canon law: censure/medicinal or expiatory. 49 A
censure can be analogized to an injunction under civil law. The
purpose is to gain the offender's compliance with the law in the
future. 0 A censure or medicinal penalty prohibits the offender
from exercising privileges or rights in the religious community."
The penalty ends when the offender reconciles himself with the
relevant law. 2 In contrast, an expiatory penalty is intended "to
repair the harm done to the community and to deter others from
similar offenses";53 therefore, the penalty does not necessarily
end when the offender has been reformed. 4 Expiatory penalties
4 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1321 § 1, at 1540 (stating that, to be
punishable, a violation committed by a person must be "gravely imputable [to that
person] by reason of malice or negligence"); see also CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183.
" See, e.g., People v. O'Brien, 31 P. 45, 47 (Cal. 1892) (explaining why ignorance
of the law is no defense).
46 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1323 20, at 1542 ("[A] person who
without negligence was ignorant that he or she violated a law or precept" is not
subject to penalties.). However, ignorance is not presumed. See id. c.15 § 2, at 69; see
also id. c.1321 § 3, at 1540 ('"Wrhen an external violation has occurred, imputability
is presumed unless it is otherwise apparent.").
47 See id. c. 1324, at 1543-44 (exempting an "accused" from an automatic penalty
if that person did know that there was a penalty associated with the law).
48 See id. c.1321, at 1540; see also CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183. Not every
violation of canon law or Church doctrine is an offense under the Code. See
CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 183 ("Not every mistake, sinful action, or violation of a
canon can be punished by church authority. Only canonical offenses can be
punished."); Green, supra note 37, at 1529 ("Not every sin is an ecclesiastical delict
warranting a penalty, yet every delict is a seriously sinful act or omission reflecting
significant, if not full, freedom and knowledge.... Furthermore, not every canonical
violation is a delict warranting a penalty.").
49 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1312, at 1534.
50 See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 187-88.
5' See id. at 187.
52 See id. at 187-88. "Since the purpose of medicinal penalties is conversion, a
censure must be lifted when the offender repents and is willing to repair the harm
done or the scandal caused." Id. at 187.
53 id.
54 See id. at 187 (explaining that an expiatory penalty may be imposed
temporarily or permanently, definitely or indefinitely); see also NEW COMMENTARY,
supra note 34, at 1554.
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include deprivation of offices, rights, or privileges; transfer of
office; or dismissal from the clerical state.5
A. Canon 1398
Canon 1398 provides: "Qui abortum procurat, effectu secuto,
in excommunicationem latae sententiae incurrit.
56
The English translation is: "A person who procures a
completed abortion incurs a latae sententiae excommunication.""
The canon is a reflection of the Church's teaching on
abortion.58 "The Catholic Church has long considered abortion to
be not only a grave moral evil but also a crime punishable by
canonical sanctions."59
s See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 187.
56 EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW c.1398, at 553 (Jorge
Miras Angel Marzoa & Rafael Rodriguez-Ocafia eds., 2004) [hereinafter EXEGETICAL
COMMENTARY]; see also CODEX IURIS CANONICI c.1398, at 502 (Canon Law Society of
America trans., 1983) (1983) [hereinafter CIC-1983].
7 NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1398, at 1602.
58 See infra Part III.A.
'9 J.P. Beal, Abortion (Canon Law), in 1 NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 31, 31
(2d ed. 2003). The earliest legislation penalizing procured abortion appeared in the
4th Century. Coriden, supra note 40, at 187. Abortion was punished similarly to
murder: exclusion from the Christian community for a specified period of time. See
id. at 188. This punishment applied to women who had abortions and those who
assisted with abortions. See id.
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A violation of Canon 1398 results in a latae sententiae6
0
excommunication.6' Contrary to popular belief, excommunication
does not mean dismissal from the Catholic Church. It is a
censure/medicinal penalty that is best analogized to a suspension
from the Church. 62  A person who is excommunicated is
prohibited from celebrating the sacraments63 and from carrying
out offices or ministries in the Church. 4 An excommunication is
always conditional. 65  A period of excommunication ends upon
performance of an act or a promise to terminate the behavior
that resulted in the censure.66 Like a civil contempt sanction, the
60 Punishments are imposed in two ways. A ferendae sententiae penalty takes
effect only after it is imposed in a judicial or administrative process. See CORIDEN,
supra note 35, at 186. A latae sententiae penalty takes effect ipso facto-by the
commission of the very offense itself. See id. No judicial or administrative
intervention is required for a latae sententiae penalty to take effect. See id. "[A]
penalty is ferendae sententiae, so that it does not bind the guilty party until after it
has been imposed; if the law or precept expressly establishes it, however, a penalty
is latae sententiae, so that it is incurred ipso facto when the delict is committed."
NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1314, at 1535. Latae sententiae penalties are
not to be imposed except for "certain singularly malicious delicts which either can
result in graver scandal or cannot be punished effectively by ferendae sententiae
penalties." See id. c.1318, at 1538. The 1983 revision of the Code made a concerted
effort to reduce the number of latae sententiae penalties; ferendae sententiae
penalties were to be the norm. See Green, supra note 37, at 1531. There was also an
effort made to reduce and consolidate the number of penal offenses. See id.
Nevertheless, the 1983 Code kept in place a latae sententiae penalty of
excommunication for violation of this canon. See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34,
c.1398, at 1602.
The latae sententiae (ipso facto) penalty attached to procured abortion has been
the subject of much debate. Some have argued that the canon is both harsh and
ineffective. See, e.g., Coriden, supra note 40, at 195-96 ("The ipso facto
excommunication as a penalty for abortion should be rescinded as a universal law of
the Church.").
61 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1398, at 1602.
62 See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 187.
63 "Those who have been excommunicated or interdicted after the imposition or
declaration of the penalty and others obstinately persevering in manifest grave sin
are not to be admitted to holy communion." NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.915,
at 1110. However, this consequence is suspended if the guilty party is in danger of
death. See id. c.1352 § 1, at 1565.
64 See id. c.1331 § 1, at 1549.
65 See CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 187 (explaining "a censure must be lifted
when the offender repents and is willing to repair the harm done or the scandal
caused").
66 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, cc.1347 § 2, at 1562, 1358 § 1, at 1571.
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excommunicated person holds the keys to his release from the
penalty.67
1. Acts Prohibited By Canon 1398
As a preliminary matter, Canon 1398 applies only to
completed abortions.68 Attempts or other incomplete offenses are
not punished by this canon.69 A 1988 ruling from the Pontifical
Council for the Interpretation of Legislative Texts made clear
that the term "abortion" applies to all procedures-whether
surgical or chemical-that result in the death of a fetus.7" Early
theologians and philosophers drew a distinction between fetuses
that were inanimate (possessing no soul) and animate
(ensouled).7" It was not until the 1917 Code that this distinction
was permanently eliminated. 2  The 1917 Code provided a
penalty of latae sententiae excommunication for the offense of
procuring an abortion.73 The 1983 revision of the Code left the
substance of this canon in place.74
67 See Mahady v. Mahady, 448 N.W.2d 888, 890 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) ("[C]ivil
contempt is said to give the contemnor the keys to the jail cell, because compliance
with the order allows him to purge himself and end the sanction.").
68 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1398, at 1602.
69 See id. c.1328 § 1, at 1546 (attempts not punished unless expressly stated in
the relevant canon); see also EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 554; NEW
COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 1603 & n.307.
70 See John L. Allen, Jr., Under Vatican Ruling, Abortion Triggers Automatic
Excommunication, NAT'L CATH. REP., Jan. 17, 2003, at 3. Prior to the 1988
interpretation, there was some debate amongst scholars about whether RU486,
intrauterine devices, and other procedures were covered by the term "abortion."
Robert Owen Morrissey, Abortion and the Excommunication of Canon 1398 in the
1983 Code of Canon Law (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Catholic University
of America) (on file with author). The drafters of the 1983 Code elected not to define
"abortion"-it was widely assumed that Church teaching on abortion was well
known. See id. at 8; see also NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 1603.
"' See Coriden, supra note 40, at 190. "The commonly accepted time of
animation was forty days after conception for males and eighty days for females!" Id.
at 192 n.33. This distinction was later removed by Pope Sixtus V but quickly
restored by his successor, Pope Gregory XIV. See id. at 192.
72 See id. at 193.
" See id.
74 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 1603; see also Morrissey, supra note
70, at 46-49. A proposal was made to make the penalty ferendae sententiae. This
proposal was rejected out of fear that the canon's effectiveness would be weakened
due to the fact that abortion is usually a very private act. See NEW COMMENTARY,
supra note 34, at 1603.
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2. Principles of Interpretation
A starting point for an analysis of Canon 1398 is Canon 18,
which provides in relevant part: "Laws which establish a
penalty ... are subject to strict interpretation."75 This canon
derives from the principle that sanctions are not intended to be
imposed any more than absolutely necessary to achieve the
desired rehabilitative and deterrent effects.76
Canon 17 gives guidance on the interpretation of
ecclesiastical laws. 7' The starting point for any canonical
analysis is the plain text of the relevant canon itself.78  If the
proper meaning of the law cannot be discerned from its text and
context, then one is to look to parallel passages, the purpose and
circumstances of the law, and to legislative intent.79
3. A Plain Meaning Analysis of Canon 1398
The canon speaks in broad terms-its penal sanction applies
to "a person"' who commits the act of procuring ("procurat" in
Latin) a completed abortion. 8' Although the canon does not
define the term procurat, it has been interpreted to mean "to
cause directly and intentionally, by means of physical or moral
action, the expulsion of the fetus from the mother's womb.8 2
Abortion is an act rarely committed alone.8 3  Doctors,
nurses-and, in the case of minors in some states, lawyers-are
75 NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.18, at 75. "Strict interpretation limits the
law's application to the minimum stated in the law." Id. at 75.
76 See id. at 75-77. In contrast, favorable laws are subject to broad
interpretation. See id. at 75. Canon 221 elaborates on the concept of restrained
punishment: "The Christian faithful have the right not to be punished with
canonical penalties except according to the norm of law." NEW COMMENTARY, supra
note 34, c.221 § 3, at 279.
" See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.17, at 73.
78 See id.
71 See id.
'o Id. c.1398, at 1602.
"' See id. The 1917 Code eliminated an exception for the pregnant woman
herself. See Lisa Sowle Cahill, Catholic Commitment and Public Responsibility, in
ABORTION AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION WITHIN THE
CATHOLIC TRADITION 131, 136 (R. Randall Rainey & Gerald Magill eds., 1996);
James A. Coriden, The Canonical Penalty for Abortion as Applicable to
Administrators of Clinics and Hospitals, 46 JURIST 652, 657 (1986).
82 See Coriden, supra note 81, at 652-53 (citation omitted) (describing several of
the ways procurat has been interpreted).
3 See Allen, supra note 70, at 4; Morrissey, supra note 70, at 14.
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all necessary to accomplish the prohibited act. 4 Pope John Paul
II commented on this fact in Evangelium Vitae." He noted that
the father of the child may place pressure on the mother-to-be to
have an abortion. 6 He may also place indirect pressure on her
by abandoning her and not giving her support.8 7 A wider circle of
family and friends may also impose personal or financial
pressure on the woman to have an abortion.8 Finally, of course,
the doctors and nurses who actually perform the procedure are
responsible because "they place at the service of death skills
which were acquired for promoting life."' 9
It can therefore be said that many people can "cause" or
"procure" an abortion: the woman, her doctors and nurses, the
politicians and judges who permit or regulate the practice, the
hospital and clinic administrators who provide facilities for the
procedure, and, in the case of minors, the lawyers who make the
procedure available by litigating a judicial bypass case. Keeping
in mind the canon's requirement of strict interpretation of penal
laws,90 procurat must be given a narrow reading. Father
Coriden, in summarizing the existing scholarship on the
interpretation of procurat, concluded that the term refers only to
direct participation in a specific abortion.9' Generalized support,
promotion, or opportunity for abortion are actions that may be
against Catholic teaching, but do not incur the delict.92 Procurat
' See CANON LAW SOC'Y OF GR. BRIT. AND IR., THE CANON LAW LETTER &
SPIRIT: A PRACTIcAL GUIDE TO THE CODE OF CANON LAW 2827, at 809 (1995).
A number of people are always involved in the carrying out of an abortion:
the pregnant mother, sometimes the father of her child, her family, friends
and advisors, those who in one way or another make possible access to the
abortive service, the surgeon who performs the operation, the attendant
nurses and other such supportive staff, politicians and legislators who
promote this service, etc. A clear distinction must always be drawn
between, on the one hand, those who thereby act sinfully and, on the other,
those who incur the canonical penalty.
Id.
85 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 4, 59.
86 See id.
87 See id.
88 See id.
89 Id.
90 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.18, at 75.
91 See Coriden, supra note 81, at 653.
92 See id. ("[The penalty] does not apply to those who are removed from...
direct participation.").
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requires direct and physical participation in the actual act of
abortion. 93
Therefore, Canon 1398, by its plain text, applies to the
pregnant woman 94 and the doctor who physically performs the
successful abortion. In contrast, a politician who votes in favor of
abortion rights does not incur the Canon 1398 penalty.
Similarly, a lawyer who assists a minor in obtaining access to an
abortion does not participate directly and physically in the death
of the fetus. The lawyer and politician are involved in the
abortion process, but only in an abstract and legal sense.
Procurat, read in conjunction with Canon 18, requires a more
direct, physical action on the part of the delinquent. 95
B. Accomplice Liability Under Canon 1329
Canon 1398 does not end the analysis, however, since the
Code of Canon Law provides a form of accomplice liability.
Canon 1329 sets forth the general rule for accomplice liability,
except if provided elsewhere in a particular penal law.96  As
Canon 1398 does not provide for accomplices one way or another,
Canon 1329 is the appropriate tool for answering the question at
hand.
In Latin, Canon 1329 states:
§ 1. Qui communi delinquendi consilio in delictum concurrunt,
neque in lege vel praecepto expresse nominantur, si poenae
ferendae sententiae in auctorem principalem constitutae sint,
iisdem poenis subiciuntur vel aliis eiusdem vel minoris
gravitatis.
§ 2. In poenam latae sententiae delicto adnexam incurrunt
complices, qui in lege vel praecepto non nominantur, si sine
eorum opera delictum patratum non esset, et poena sit talis
naturae, ut ipsos afficere possit; secus poenis ferendae sententiae
puniri possunt.
97
" See id. at 654.
94 If an abortion is performed involuntarily upon a woman, she would obviously
not incur the delict.
95 See Coriden, supra note 81, at 654.
96 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1329 § 1, at 1547.
97 CIC-1983, supra note 56, c.1329, at 478. The 1917 version of Canon 1329
recognized several different classes of cooperators, including procurers, co-authors,
active accomplices, negative accomplices, and accessories after the fact. For latae
sententiae penalties, the 1983 Code merged all of the historical categories into the
aforementioned but-for test of accomplice liability. See Coriden, supra note 81, at
653-54; see also H. A. AYRINHAC, PENAL LEGISLATION IN THE NEW CODE OF CANON
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In English:
§ 1. If ferendae sententiae penalties are established for the
principal perpetrator, those who conspire together to commit a
delict and are not expressly named in a law or precept are
subject to the same penalties or to others of the same or lesser
gravity.
§ 2. Accomplices who are not named in a law or precept incur a
latae sententiae penalty attached to a delict if without their
assistance the delict would not have been committed, and the
penalty is of such a nature that it can affect them; otherwise,
they can be punished by ferendae sententiae penalties.98
As Canon 1398 imposes a latae sententiae penalty,99 section 2
of Canon 1329 applies. Canon 1329 essentially establishes a but-
for test for accomplice liability: 00  But-for the accomplice's
assistance, would the offense have been committed? 10 ' If not,
then it can be said that the accomplice's assistance was necessary
and the latae sententiae penalty would be incurred. However, if
an accomplice's assistance was helpful but not necessary, the
accomplice does not incur the latae sententiae penalty, but can be
punished with a ferendae sententiae penalty. 10 2
There are certain groups of people that plainly satisfy the
but-for test of Canon 1329. Nurses who assist with the procedure
are necessary accomplices to the physician who "procures" the
LAW 53, at 70-71 (1920); EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 311;
STANISLAUS WOYWOD, A PRACTICAL COMMENTARY ON THE CODE OF CANON LAW
2040, at 454 (Callistus Smith ed., 1957); Morrissey, supra note 70, at 15-17
(discussing accomplice liability in canon law).
98 NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1329, at 1547.
99 See id. c.1398, at 1602.
'00 See Morrissey, supra note 70, at 20-22. But see infra Part II.C.
0' "Paragraph two on latae sententiae penalties somewhat more explicitly
differentiates between necessary collaborators (accomplices strictly speaking) and
secondary collaborators. Necessary collaborators are liable to the same penalty as
the principal offender if it can affect them." NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at
1548.
02 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1329 § 2, at 479. This distinction
between necessary and helpful-but-not-necessary accomplices was made by the
commentators of the Canon Law Society of America in NEW COMMENTARY ON THE
CODE OF CANON LAW: "Necessary collaborators are those without whose cooperation
the delict could not have been committed.. .. The involvement of secondary
collaborators, on the other hand, is not essential to the commission of the delict ....
Given their lesser delictual involvement, such secondary collaborators are
correspondingly punished less severely than the principal offender." NEW
COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 1547.
394 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:379
abortion. "3 Similarly, a parent who forces a child to have an
otherwise unwanted abortion is also a necessary accomplice:
without the direct pressure, the child would not have had the
abortion.'04
Father Coriden has noted that commentators to both the
1917 and 1983 Codes have drawn a distinction between those
who show generalized support for abortion and those persons
who are necessary for a particular abortion.' °5 Only the latter
incur the canonical penalty of Canon 1398 by way of Canon
1329.106 In other words, general support for abortion rights does
not incur the delict of Canon 1398. Legislators who vote in favor
of pro-choice legislation, therefore, are not automatically
excommunicated, even under a reading of Canon 1329.107
Arguments have been made, however, that they should be
sanctioned under other provisions of the Code,'0° such as the
canon prohibiting heresy'0 9 or the canon forbidding the Eucharist
to those who persist in manifest grave sin."0
Utilizing this general-versus-specific distinction, Father
Coriden concluded that administrators of hospitals where
abortions are performed do not incur the automatic
excommunication of Canon 1398.11 On the one hand,
administrators make specific abortions possible and, thus, but-for
their assistance the procedures could not occur. However, they
are too far removed from specific abortions. Their support is
general, not specific to any one abortion." 2  Most hospital
administrators do not get to know individual patients. They
103 See Morrissey, supra note 70, at 22.
'04 See id.
'0' See Coriden, supra note 81, at 654-57.
'06 See id.; Beal, supra note 59, at 32 (penalty imposed on "those cooperators in
an abortion whose cooperation was necessary for the commission of the offense. In
other words, only those without whose efforts a particular abortion would not have
occurred incur the 'automatic' penalty of excommunication").
107 See John P. Beal, Holy Communion and Unholy Politics, AMERICA, June 21-
28, 2004, at 16, 17.
108 See id. at 17 (discussing other possible canons under which these politicians
can be punished).
109 NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, cc.751, at 915, 1364, at 1575.
1' Id. c.915, at 1110; see also Beal, supra note 107, at 17.
.. See Coriden, supra note 81, at 654-55 ("Since [Catholics who administer
hospitals or direct clinics where abortions are performed] do not fall within the scope
of those who 'procure abortions' in the meaning of the canon, [they] do not incur the
latae sententiae excommunication provided by canon 1398 of the 1983 code.").
112 See id. at 654-57.
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have no vested interest in a specific woman getting an abortion.
Therefore, he concluded that administrators do not incur a latae
sententiae excommunication." 3
In comparison, a lawyer who represents a particular minor
in a judicial bypass proceeding would be a necessary cooperator
to a specific abortion. He is directly involved in the death of a
particular fetus. In states with judicial bypass statutes, a minor
cannot obtain an abortion without first getting permission of
either a parent or the court." 4 Without the lawyer's assistance,
therefore, the minor would not have been able to obtain the
abortion. While the lawyer did not provide the direct, physical
cause-and-effect assistance to constitute procurat under Canon
1398, he is still delinquent under a theory of accomplice liability
through Canon 1329.115
Two points about minors and Canon 1398 warrant
discussion. The 1983 Code provides generous exceptions to
imputability for persons who are below the age of 16' 16 or
ignorant of the law." 7 I suspect that, because of these provisions,
the number of minors who are truly imputable is small."' Does
this affect the imputability of their lawyers? No. Every
cooperator is an individual and must be treated as such. The fact
that one accomplice (the client) is not imputable does not change
the facts that the delict (the abortion) happened and the lawyer
assisted in its occurrence." 9 The need to reform the Catholic
13 On this basis, the 1986 excommunication of Mary Ann Sorrentino, director of
Planned Parenthood of Rhode Island, was improper. See Excommunicated,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 5-12, 1986, at 112; A Rare Excommunication, TIME, Feb.
3, 1986, at 25. Ms. Sorrentino was told that she could not participate in her
daughter's confirmation because of her support for abortion. A Church official said
that she had "excommunicated herself' based on her pro-choice views and advocacy
in helping women obtain abortions. See Excommunicated, supra, at 113. Ms.
Sorrentino's support for abortion was general, not specific to any one client or
patient. It is possible she was not truly "excommunicated," but instead denied the
ability to participate in a sacrament under another canon.
114 See supra text accompanying notes 5 and 7.
"' It is no defense to the canonical penalty that the minor could have gone to
another lawyer to get the judicial bypass. If this were a defense, a doctor could argue
that he was not a necessary cooperator because the patient could have gone to any
one of several abortion providers. The canon would lose all efficacy.
116 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.1323 10, at 1542.
117 See id. c.1323 2°, at 1542; James A. Coriden, Even in Lincoln, Doubtful Laws
Don't Apply, COMMONWEAL, Apr. 19, 1996, at 6, 7.
118 "[L]atae sententiae penalties are very rarely incurred because of the
prevalence of mitigating circumstances." CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 186.
..9 In Angel Marzoa's commentary to Canon 1329, he states:
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lawyer-which is the ultimate purpose of a medicinal penalty-is
not obviated by the client's personal defense to prosecution under
Canon 1323 based on lack of imputability.1
20
C. A Final Word and Caution on Reasonable Doubt, Assistance,
and Imputability
I end this section where I began, with Canon 18's
requirement of strict interpretation. If my analysis is subject to
reasonable doubt or disagreement, then the canonical penalty
cannot be imposed. Unlike the rule of lenity in American
criminal law,1 21 Canon 18 applies to all penal laws-not just
those that are ambiguous.
22
A lawyer's assistance does not rise to the physical level of
procurat so as to incur the penalty of Canon 1398 directly as a
principal. If the lawyer is delinquent, it can only be because he
has acted as a necessary accomplice under Canon 1329. Canon
1329 applies only if the lawyer's "assistance" (in Latin, "opera')
Modifying circumstances arising from the subjective element affect only
the co-delinquents affected by it. The common will that is the presumption
for co-delinquency is the result of the will of each person; but each person
must be considered individually in his singular phenomenology: for
example, age, possible ignorance, fear, etc., in each of the co-delinquents.
EXEGETICAL COMMENTARY, supra note 56, at 314.
This principle is also consistent with American criminal law. If P, a principal to
a crime, is assisted in a crime by A, his accomplice, A will be found guilty even if P is
acquitted based on an "excuse defense," such as insanity, involuntary intoxication, or
duress. An excuse defense "means that the actions of the primary party were
wrongful, but that he was not responsible for them because of the excusing
condition." JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 481 (3d ed. 2001). In
contrast, if P is acquitted based on a justification defense-a crime never occurred
because he was justified in committing the act, such as when P acts in self-defense-
the accomplice is not liable. See id. Imputability under canon law is closer to an
excuse defense than justification because it does not negate the immorality of the
conduct. Canon law, for example, does not permit a 15-year-old to have an abortion;
it simply says that she cannot be punished for doing so. See NEW COMMENTARY,
supra note 34, c.1323 10, at 1542.
121 "Actually, latae sententiae penalties are very rarely incurred because of the
prevalence of mitigating circumstances." CORIDEN, supra note 35, at 186.
"' See, e.g., In re Kimberly H., 196 A.D.2d 192, 194-95, 609 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991-
92 (1st Dep't 1994). At issue was whether an ATM card is a debit/credit card for
purposes of enhanced penal law for criminal possession of stolen property; the court
found there was ambiguity in the statute and therefore the construction "more
favorable to the defendant should be adopted in accordance with the rule of lenity."
Id.
122 NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.18, at 75 ("Laws which establish a
penalty, restrict the free exercise of rights, or contain an exception from the law are
subject to strict interpretation.").
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was "necessary." What is it that he is "assisting?" It is not the
physical act of the death of the fetus, but instead the minor's
decision or ability to have the physical act performed. His
assistance is a step or two removed from the act, and is legal, not
physical, in nature.
Delinquency for the lawyer therefore turns on one's reading
of the Latin word opera in Canon 1329, which has been officially
translated into English as "assistance."' 121 If opera requires
physical assistance, then the lawyer would not be delinquent. A
nurse, however, who physically assists the doctor with the
procedure (but does not perform the procedure herself) would be
a necessary accomplice. A lawyer's assistance is not with the
actual, physical procedure; it is with providing the opportunity
for the physical act to occur. If, on the other hand, opera includes
not just physical but also other forms of assistance, such as legal,
then the lawyer is delinquent.
1 24
In reality, the delict of Canon 1398-by way of Canon 1329-
will rarely be incurred by lawyers who provide assistance to
minors in judicial bypass proceedings. Imputability under
Canons 1321 and 1323 requires knowledge of the delict, the
automatic nature of the penalty, and the intent to violate the
same. 25 Catholic lawyers who provide representation in judicial
bypass cases but who do so with ignorance of the canonical
implications for their actions cannot be punished. Education and
counseling of such lawyers would be appropriate. Lawyers'
persistence after such informal interventions would then result
in delinquency.
Finally, even if a lawyer does not incur the latae sententiae
penalty of Canon 1398, he could still be subject to a ferendae
123 See id. c.1329 § 2, at 1547.
124 The Oxford Latin Dictionary defines "opera" as "[an a]ctivity devoted to a
task, effort," "to devote one's attention, apply oneself (to an activity or task)," and
"[w]ork as occupying a person's efforts, employment." Of particular relevance is the
definition, "[s]ervices in a particular capacity, professional services, labour, etc."
OXFORD LATIN DICTIONARY 1251 (P.G.W. Glare ed., 1997) (1976). This textual
analysis suggests that opera is not limited to acts of physical assistance. If this is
true, then the lawyer's actions would be opera and result in delinquency.
Here I acknowledge my only shortcomings as a novice in this area. As part of
the continuing dialogue of legal scholarship, I invite further debate and response to
this article from those more knowledgeable about Latin, Canon Law, and specifically
about the type of assistance contemplated by the term opera.
125 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, cc.1321 § 1, at 1540, 1323 20, at 1542.
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sententiae penalty after a judicial/administrative process. 12 6
Here, too, the concept of imputability will greatly restrict the
number of lawyers who could be punished.
III. THE MORAL IDENTITY OF A CATHOLIC LAWYER
Even if the lawyer does not incur a latae sententiae or
ferendae sententiae penalty for his professional assistance, there
remains another question: Whether, as a matter of morality, the
Catholic lawyer should take the case in the first place. The Code
of Canon Law does not define the boundaries of morality. It is,
instead, a set of rules that facilitates the spiritual and worldly
business of the Church.
The role of Catholics in public life is not a new subject for
theologians or Catholic laypeople. Abortion, in particular, has
caused much public discussion regarding the role of religion in
public life. Catholic lawyers face this tension in judicial bypass
petitions, the prosecution of capital cases, and advocacy for active
euthanasia.127 Catholic politicians, likewise, can face a conflict
between religious duty and obligation to their constituents.128
Catholic doctors must decide whether to perform abortions as
part of their practices.
129
A. Catholic Teaching on Abortion
The Catholic Church's teachings on the immorality of
abortion could not be more clear: "The Catholic Church has
always regarded abortion as an abominable crime because
unqualified respect for even the very beginnings of life is a logical
consequence of the mysteries of creation and redemption.''
130
126 See id. c.1329 § 2, at 1547.
127 See, e.g., Kevin M. Doyle, A Catholic Lawyer's View of the Death Penalty, 29
ST. MARY'S L.J. 949, 949 (1998) (containing a lawyer's description of a Catholic
district attorney who finds the death penalty morally indefensible, yet seeks death
sentences repeatedly).
121 See CDF, supra note 1, 2.
.29 Pope Paul VI addressed a group of Catholic doctors and discussed their
obligations to promote understanding of the beginnings of life. See Pope Paul VI,
Respect for Life in the Womb, Address to the Medical Association of Western
Flanders (Apr. 23, 1977), in 22 POPE SPEAKS 281 (1977).
30 Id. at 281-82.
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Respect for life is a core teaching of Christianity. 3' Abortion is
considered a crime against life.
32
American Catholic authorities responded swiftly after Roe v.
Wade'33 to condemn the decision 3 4 and to call for a constitutional
amendment prohibiting abortion. 3  Catholic hospitals were
prohibited from performing abortions, even if required to do so by
civil law. 1
36
B. Amorality in Public Life?
One approach to resolving a conflict between an individual's
religious beliefs and duties, on the one hand, and professional
duties (to clients, patients, or voters), on the other hand, is to
allow the Catholic-professional to engage in a sort of "role
amorality."'37  This view of individual identity posits that one
131 "Human life must be respected and protected absolutely from the moment of
conception. From the first moment of his existence, a human being must be
recognized as having the rights of a person-among which is the inviolable right of
every innocent being to life." CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 2270 (2d ed.
1997). This gospel of life comes in part from the Commandment, "You shall not kill."
EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 4, 52.
132 "Among all the crimes which can be committed against life, procured
abortion has characteristics making it particularly serious and deplorable. The
Second Vatican Council defines abortion, together with infanticide, as an
'unspeakable crime.'" EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 4, 58; see also Cahill, supra
note 81, at 134.
This is not to say that Church teaching has always been consistent as to what
constitutes "abortion." Early Church thinkers, for example, believed that a fetus was
not "ensouled" immediately upon conception. The pre-ensoulment termination of
pregnancy was not considered procured abortion or a crime. See Cahill, supra note
81, at 135; Allen, supra note 70, at 3. Today, abortion includes the termination of life
from conception on, by any means (chemical or surgical). See id.
For a history of Catholic teaching on abortion, see M.A. Taylor, Abortion, in 1
NEW CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, supra note 59, at 24, 26-29.
133 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
134 After Roe v. Wade, bishops from the Committee for Pro-Life Affairs issued a
statement, 'This [decision] is bad morality, bad medicine and bad public policy, and
it cannot be harmonized with basic moral principles.... We have no choice but to
urge that the Court's judgement [sic] be opposed and rejected." Lisa M. Hisel,
Catholicism and Abortion Since Roe v. Wade, CONSCIENCE, Jan. 31, 1998, at 5
(alteration in original).
... The National Conference on Catholic Bishops issued a statement in 1973
calling for a constitutional amendment to overrule Roe. See id. at 6.
136 See id. at 5-6.
137 See CDF, supra note 1, 2 ("Catholics... are asked not to base their
contribution to society and political life-through the legitimate means available to
everyone in a democracy-on their particular understanding of the human person
and the common good.")
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can, and should, separate out one's public and private lives.'38 In
private, a Catholic may detest abortion, consistent with the
Church's teachings. When that same Catholic enters the public
realm and serves as a politician, for example, he could argue that
his support of pro-choice legislation is justified because he is
simply voting for what his pro-choice constituents want. In this
way, he assumes that his identity can be separated into public
and private roles. As a private Catholic, he opposes abortion. As
a public actor, he claims the ability and the duty to put aside his
personal beliefs and support what his constituents want.
Similarly, a Catholic lawyer who represents a minor in a judicial
bypass proceeding could argue that he is simply advocating for
what his client wants and that it is not his position to judge his
client's morality or to impose his religious beliefs on the minor.
He, too, claims to wear two "hats"-that of a good Catholic in
private and an obedient, amoral lawyer in public.
This kind of amoral professional identity has been rejected
by the Church. The Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith
issued a doctrinal note on the subject of pro-choice politicians in
2004.139 The Congregation saw a disintegration of the rule of
natural law-the concept that there exists fundamental truths of
morality and reason.1 40 This decline of natural law has led to a
growth of moral autonomy, where each citizen believes he is free
to decide for himself what is or is not moral.' 4' Legislators, too,
see themselves as amoral beings-not free to impose their
personal, moral beliefs on others. They argue that they are
guided only by the personal preferences and beliefs of their
constituents. 142
... See id.
139 See generally CDF, supra note 1. The note was approved by Pope John Paul
II on November 21, 2002.
140 See id. 2.
141 See id. ("A kind of cultural relativism exists today, evident in the
conceptualization and defence of an ethical pluralism, which sanctions the
decadence and disintegration of reason and the principles of the natural moral
law.").
142 See id.
As a result, citizens claim complete autonomy with regard to their moral
choices, and lawmakers maintain that they are respecting this freedom of
choice by enacting laws which ignore the principles of natural ethics and
yield to ephemeral cultural and moral trends, as if every possible outlook
on life were of equal value.
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The Congregation rejected this line of thinking. It confirmed
a bedrock principle of Judeo-Christian theology: there are indeed
fundamental, moral truths. The Congregation did not say,
however, that being Catholic means giving up one's autonomy to
make decisions. There are many political decisions over which
reasonable minds can differ. 43  The Congregation stated,
however, that there are certain basic, moral beliefs for which
there is universal truth and over which there cannot be
reasonable disagreement.'" These basic, foundational beliefs
include the sanctity of life and the prohibitions against abortion
and euthanasia.1 45 Within the boundaries of basic morality, there
are a great number of subjects over which Catholics and all
people can have reasonable disagreements. 46 Outside of these
boundaries, however, respect for individual autonomy cannot be
a justification for violation of a basic principle of morality, such
as the sanctity of life.
47
"The church's magisterium has emphasized that politicians
are not free to leave their moral principles in the cloakroom when
they go to the floor of the legislature, or on the bus when they
espouse public policy positions on the campaign trail."'' 48  This
'4 See id. 3.
'4 These basic, moral beliefs include defending the right to life from conception
to death, opposing divorce, defending the freedom to educate one's children,
protecting children, protecting religious freedom, fighting for an economy that serves
the common good, pursuing peace, and rejecting violence. See Robert K. Vischer,
Faith, Pluralism, and the Practice of Law, 43 CATH. LAW. 17, 19-20 (2004).
145 See CDF, supra note 1, 4.
146 See id. 99 3, 6.
141 See id. 9 6.
148 See Beal, supra note 107, at 16.
It is a question of the lay Catholic's duty to be morally coherent, found
within one's conscience, which is one and indivisible. 'There cannot be two
parallel lives in their existence: on the one hand, the so-called 'spiritual
life', with its values and demands; and on the other, the so-called 'secular'
life, that is, life in a family, at work, in social responsibilities, in the
responsibilities of public life and in culture. The branch, engrafted to the
vine which is Christ, bears its fruit in every sphere of existence and
activity. In fact, every area of the lay faithful's lives, as different as they
are, enters into the plan of God, who desires that these very areas be the
'places in time' where the love of Christ is revealed and realized for both
the glory of the Father and service of others. Every activity, every
situation, every precise responsibility-as, for example, skill and solidarity
in work, love and dedication in the family and the education of children,
service to society and public life and the promotion of truth in the area of
culture-are the occasions ordained by providence for a 'continuous
exercise of faith, hope and charity.'"
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has not stopped Catholic politicians from trying to claim amoral
professional autonomy to justify pro-choice positions. The debate
over Catholic professional identity came to a head during the
2004 U.S. presidential election when pro-choice Catholic John F.
Kerry won the Democratic Party's nomination. 4 9 Some bishops
declared that they would not give communion to Kerry because of
his pro-choice views and public positions."O This, incidentally,
was not the first time that pro-choice Catholic politicians came
into conflict with the Church's teachings. 5'
CDF, supra note 1, 6 (quoting John Paul II, Apostolic Exhortation Christifideles
Laici 59 (Dec. 30, 1988)).
149 See, e.g., Julia Duin, Kerry Cited in Catholic Heresy Case; Lawyer Says
Senator Unfit for Eucharist, WASH. TIMES, July 1, 2004, at A4; Michael Paulson &
Patrick Healy, O'Malley Won't Offer Blessing; Paulist Priest to Deliver Invocation,
BOSTON GLOBE, July 26, 2004, at C3; Amy Sullivan, Kerry & Religion: Can He Reach
'Persuadable' Catholics?, COMMONWEAL, June 4, 2004, at 13; Tim Townsend, Burke
Clarifies Voting Stance, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 2004, at Al.
150 See Sullivan, supra note 149, at 13. The Archbishop of Dublin cautioned,
"[t]he Eucharist must not become a political battleground." Id. A Pew Research
Center poll found that 72% of Catholics did not believe that pro-choice politicians
should be denied communion. See Chuck Haga, Church Meets State, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Oct. 16, 2004, at lA.
Bishop Rene Henry Gracida of Corpus Christi, Texas, in a 2004 article, described
a case history of the process he went through in trying to get a Catholic pro-choice
politician to change his public stance on the subject. See generally Gracida, supra
note 40. Bishop Gracida ultimately imposed an excommunication on the politician.
See id.
... In 1983, Cardinal John O'Connor of New York publicly stated that Vice
Presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro could be in trouble with the Church
because she supported the right of a woman to get an abortion. See Hisel, supra note
134, at 8. Catholic bishops had stated that it was not possible to separate morality
from public policy. See id. In 1991, eight anti-abortion groups delivered to the Pope
the names of Catholic politicians who they thought warranted excommunication
because of their public positions in favor of a right to abortion. See Excommunication
Plea, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Dec. 11, 1991, at 1160. The politicians included Senator
Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Governor Mario Cuomo, and Senator Edward Kennedy.
See id. There was no papal response to the petition. See id.
In 1984, New York Governor Mario Cuomo delivered a speech in which he
defended his belief in amoral professional identity:
While we always owe our bishops' words respectful attention and careful
consideration, the question whether to engage the political system in a
struggle to have it adopt certain articles of our belief as part of public
morality is not a matter of doctrine: it is a matter of prudential political
judgement [sic].... With regard to abortion, the American bishops have
had to weigh Catholic moral teaching against the fact of a pluralistic
country where our view is in the minority, acknowledging that what is
ideally desirable isn't always feasible, that there can be different political
approaches to abortion besides unyielding adherence to an absolute
prohibition.
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C. A Conflict with the Duty to Promote Social Justice?
Can an argument also be made that amorality furthers the
goal of social justice? One of the core traditions of Catholicism is
the involvement of the faithful in efforts to influence public policy
in favor of social justice.152 Catholics can, and should, help shape
society to promote positive social change.'53 This is reflected,
most strikingly, in the efforts by Catholics to aid the poor.'54
Promoting social justice involves not only volunteering at a soup
kitchen or donating money to a relief mission. It also embodies
the idea of involvement in public life to address the root causes of
poverty and other social ills.155 The concept of social justice is
rooted in the dignity of the human person.'5 6 This duty is so
paramount to the beliefs of all Catholics that the legislator
included it as an obligation of the faithful in Canon 222.1
57
Catholic lawyers have a special duty to aid the poor and
others who need access to justice. In a 1965 address to the
International Association of Lawyers, Pope Paul VI discussed the
role of lawyers in society.'58 He noted that the Church looks upon
lawyers with "the greatest esteem and respect"-we are
"[m]inister[s] of charity[,]" who seek out truth and make the
justice system available to all, including the poor and
uneducated.' 59 He spoke of the role of lawyers in guiding clients,
analogizing them to patients who need medical treatment and
students who need education.' 60 In carrying out their day-to-day
work, "[p]erhaps no one, except the priest, understands human
life better in its extremely varied aspects-its most dramatic, its
Hisel, supra note 134, at 8.
152 See R. Randall Rainey, Gerard Magill & Kevin O'Rourke, Introduction:
Abortion, the Catholic Church, and Public Policy, in ABORTION AND PUBLIC POLICY:
AN INTERDISCIPLINARY INVESTIGATION WITHIN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION, supra
note 81, at 1, 2.
153 See id.
154 "[The Christian faithful] are also obliged to promote social justice and,
mindful of the precept of the Lord, to assist the poor from their own resources." NEW
COMMENTARY, supra note 34, c.222 § 2, at 283.
'5 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, at 283-84.
156 See id.
157 See id. c.222 § 2, at 283.
158 See generally Pope Paul VI, The Lawyer's Role, Address to Representatives of
the International Association of Lawyers (May 14, 1965), in 10 POPE SPEAKS 294
(1964).
159 See id. at 294.
16o See id.
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most sorrowful, sometimes its most defective, but often its best
aspects."16'
The duty to help the poor is an ethical obligation of all
lawyers. The Ethical Considerations of the ABA Code of
Professional Responsibility encouraged lawyers to accept court
appointments in indigent cases and to otherwise assist the
poor. 162 The current ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct
recognize a professional duty to accept court appointments to
represent the indigent, absent good cause.m
63
Although little data exists on the demographics of those who
seek judicial bypasses, I suspect that most potential petitioners
are economically poor. Minors themselves generally have few
assets or income. They are most often dependent on their
parents for support. They are expected to devote their time to
school, not work. Although teenage pregnancy cuts across all
socioeconomic strata, there is some evidence to suggest that the
problem disproportionately falls on girls in lower socioeconomic
strata 164 and among racial and ethnic minority groups. 65  The
teenagers who seek a judicial bypass, however, are more likely to
be white and upper-middle class, evincing a disparity along race
and class lines in terms of who is actually accessing this legal
remedy.'
66
161 Id. at 294-95.
162 See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980); Teresa Stanton
Collett, Professional Versus Moral Duty: Accepting Appointments in Unjust Civil
Cases, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 635, 639-40 (1997).
163
A lawyer shall not seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a
person except for good cause, such as: ... (c) the client or the cause is so
repugnant to the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer
relationship or the lawyer's ability to represent the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT, R. 6.2 (2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; see
also Collett, supra note 162, at 639-40.
' See Rebekah Levine Coley & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Adolescent
Pregnancy and Parenthood: Recent Evidence and Future Directions, 53 AM.
PSYCHOLOGIST 152, 153 (1998) (noting that female adolescents raised in poverty are
at higher risk of teenage pregnancy).
165 See id. at 152 (citing adolescent births as being highest among Hispanics and
African-Americans, not whites); Stanley K. Henshaw & Dina J. Feivelson, Teenage
Abortion and Pregnancy Statistics by State, 1996, 32 FAMILY PLANNING
PERSPECTIVES 272, 275 (2000) (pregnancy rates highest among black adolescents,
intermediate among Hispanics, and lowest among non-Hispanic whites).
166 See Simone Liebman, Striking a Parental Notification Statute Under Oregon
Constitutional Law, 70 OR. L. REV. 651, 657 (1991) (discussing results from
Minnesota).
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In the abstract, a strong argument could be made that the
pro bono or court appointed representation of minors in judicial
bypass cases actually serves the duty to promote social justice.
These lawyers make a legal remedy available to those who
would, without their assistance, be shut out from the legal
system.167 Roe opened up a legal right to all women, including
underage girls. States that have attempted to limit this right by
requiring notification or consent of a child's parents, also must
provide a mechanism--ordinarily, through the courts-to bypass
the parents. Every client-rich or poor, male or female, pregnant
or not, Catholic or not-deserves the guiding hand of an
experienced lawyer-advocate. Can it be that, in the case of
abortion, this is one area where a Catholic lawyer should not
help to satisfy an unmet legal need?
D. Catholic Lawyers
A Catholic lawyer who helps a minor to obtain a judicial
bypass must come to grips with the moral reality that he is
167 A minor could probably represent herself in a judicial bypass proceeding.
Texas law, for example, contains several provisions designed to assist the pro se
applicant. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003(m) (Vernon 2002) (uniform
petition form to be used); id. § 33.003(n) (no filing fees for a judicial bypass petition);
id. § 33.004(d) (uniform notice of appeal form); id. § 33.004(e) (no filing fee for
appeal); id. § 33.011 (requiring the Department of Health to produce and distribute
materials, in English and Spanish, that explain the abortion rights of a minor); TEX.
PARENTAL NOTIFICATION R. 1.7 (rules to be made available to minors without
charge) (LEXIS through 2005 changes); id. R. 2.1(b)(2) (petition filed in improper
court must be transferred by the clerk, not refused).
The clerk must give prompt assistance-in a manner designed to protect
the minor's confidentiality and anonymity-to persons seeking to file an
application. If requested, the clerk must administer the oath required for
the verification page or provide a person authorized to do so. The clerk
should also redact from the cover page any information identifying the
minor. The clerk should ensure that both the cover page and the separate
verification page are completed in full.
Id. R. 2.2(a).
The court should attempt to rule on the application without regard to
technical defects in the application or the evidence. Affidavits of persons
other than applicants are admissible. Statements in the application cannot
be offered as evidence to support the application. If necessary, the court
may assist the minor in remedying technical defects in the application and
in presenting relevant and material facts.
Id. R. 2.4(e). Despite these protections for pro se litigants, having an attorney
improves the minor's chances of success because of the proof that is required, the
emotional and stressful nature of the proceeding, and the possible hostility of the
trial judge.
406 JOURNAL OF CATHOLIC LEGAL STUDIES [Vol. 44:379
assisting a person to commit an act that the Church teaches as
unequivocally immoral. He cannot justify this by adherence to
amorality or moral relativism-that, as a lawyer, he does not
make moral judgments about or for his client, that he is only
following the law, providing access to justice, and enabling his
young client to have full access to her rights under the law. He
also cannot justify his actions by adherence to the pursuit of
social justice. To the Catholic Church, abortion is not social
justice, but murder.
From the perspective of Catholic teaching, there is no middle
ground or debate on the fundamental dignity of the human
person and the right to life. 68 A Catholic's morality, as a natural
law concept, is not governed by the positive law of a given day or
location.' 69  Central to Judeo-Christian theology is a belief in
objective good and evil. 7 ° A "properly formed conscience" is a
Catholic's "ethical compass" and helps him choose between the
two in day-to-day decisions. 7' Faith is not an on-off switch that
can be disengaged during the nine-to-five workday. 7 2 A Catholic
uses his morality and conscience to guide all aspects of his life.'73
Perhaps the role of lawyer is different from other
professionals. As lawyers, we are ordinarily not allowed to make
decisions as to what is best for our clients. The ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct command us to obey our clients' wishes
as to the objectives of the representation.'74 We are forbidden by
the rules of our profession from imposing our decisions and
beliefs about morality upon our clients. There is something
appealing to this client-centered model of lawyering. The model
of lawyer-as-agent places the decision-making power in the
.68 See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 4, 68-74 (discussing the problem of
ethical relativism present in society and in the legal system).
169 See Collett, supra note 162, at 653; Robert J. Muise, Professional
Responsibility for Catholic Lawyers: The Judgment of Conscience, 71 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 771, 773-74 (1996) (explaining that to Catholics, "the Lord as God is the core
and heart of the Law").
7 See Muise, supra note 169, at 782-83.
171 See id. at 771-72.
72 See Vischer, supra note 144, at 19-20. "[Catholic teaching] precludes the
acceptability of the segmented life .... Id. at 20.
... See id. at 19-20.
'74 See MODEL RULES, supra note 163, R. 1.2(a) ("[A] lawyer shall abide by a
client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, as required by
Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued.").
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hands of the party that will have to live with the outcome of the
case: the client. Clearly, then, a Catholic lawyer cannot tell his
client that he will not seek a judicial bypass, if that is in fact
what she wants. 7 5  But that does not answer the question of
whether the Catholic lawyer should accept the case in the first
place.
Putting aside the Code of Canon Law for a moment, can a
Catholic lawyer morally represent a minor in a judicial bypass
proceeding under the rationale that it is the client who
ultimately makes the decision whether to have an abortion? No.
The lawyer makes the immoral practice available to the minor.
But for his assistance, the abortion would not occur. 17 6 He is not
a disinterested, neutral party who is simply performing a rote
task, like a court clerk who accepts a petition for filing. A
lawyer, as a trained professional, places all of his education,
skills, and experience into diligently representing'77 his client's
position.'
Lawyers are frequently called upon to advocate for positions
which they do not necessarily personally espouse. To an extent,
a certain degree of amoral agency is assumed in the lawyering
role under American legal ethics. But that does not mean a
Catholic must accept every case that walks in the door or, for
that matter, must be a lawyer at all. The decisions to be a
175 Cf. Vischer, supra note 144, at 17.
176 The argument can again be made that the child-client could simply go to
another lawyer. However, there may be only a few lawyers in a given community
that will agree to handle these types of cases. There is no guarantee that in a given
community the client would be able to find a lawyer to handle the case. The
morality-rightness or wrongness--of one's actions should not depend on the
attorney population of the community one lives in.
177 A lawyer has an ethical obligation to zealously represent the stated interests
of his client:
A lawyer should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition,
obstruction or personal inconvenience to the lawyer, and take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or
endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf.
MODEL RULES, supra note 163, R. 1.3 cmt. 1.
' See Collett, supra note 162, at 664-65 ("By accepting [a] court appointment
in judicial bypass proceedings, the lawyer would be agreeing to publicly defend the
act of abortion and to make that act possible through obtaining a court order
authorizing the procedure.").
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lawyer or to accept a client who wants a judicial bypass are both
voluntary 7 9 and, in this case, with moral consequences.
This conclusion does not mean Catholic lawyers must turn in
their bar cards and resign from the profession. Just the opposite
is true-lawyers, as ministers of justice, have a vital role to play
in ensuring access to justice.8 0 What is at issue is a narrow
range of cases-petitions for a judicial bypass, prosecutions
where the death penalty is sought, and the representation of a
person seeking active euthanasia-where the lawyer would be
called upon to advocate a position that is in direct conflict with a
fundamental belief of his faith. As stated by Professor Vischer:
[T]he vision illuminated by the [Congregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith] allows the Catholic lawyer to function as a lawyer
in a liberal democracy by justifying her deference to the rightful
preeminence of the client. Where the client's objectives
implicate values that diverge from the lawyer's own religion-
based values, but do not contradict the fundamental dignity of
the human person embodied in the moral law, affording
autonomy to the client is appropriate, as is the secular state's
autonomy from faith communities' claims of religious truth.
Such deference is necessarily limited only where the client
proposes a course of conduct that clashes with the moral law's
conception of the human person.181
CONCLUSION
Canonically and morally, a Catholic lawyer should not
represent a minor who seeks a judicial bypass. The lawyer who
undertakes such a representation, with knowledge of the crime
and the canonical penalty, incurs the latae sententiae (automatic)
excommunication of Canon 1398 because he is a necessary
accomplice to the abortion act. I8 2 Morally, he is assisting another
person to commit a violation of a fundamental, moral belief of the
Catholic faith. Whether for pay or pro bono, such cases should be
declined by the lawyer.
This is arguably a conclusion that conflicts with the duty of
all Catholics to promote social justice. Although lawyers are
179 In the Conclusion, I will address what should happen if a Catholic lawyer is
involuntarily forced to represent a minor in a judicial bypass.
o80 See Pope Paul VI, supra note 158, at 294.
'8' Vischer, supra note 144, at 23-24 (footnote omitted).
182 See NEW COMMENTARY, supra note 34, cc.1329, at 1547, 1398, at 1602. This
assumes that "opera" includes acts of non-physical assistance. See supra Part II.C.
2005] SEEKING A JUDICIAL BYPASS FOR AN ABORTION 409
uniquely positioned to assist the poor to obtain access to justice,
this is one type of pro bono case that should be left to others to
handle. For a Catholic lawyer interested in helping children,
there are many other unmet legal needs in the areas of
delinquency, abuse, neglect, public benefits, foster care, and
adoption for which pro bono assistance of skilled lawyers is
desperately needed.
What, then, is a lawyer to do if he is appointed by a judge to
represent a minor in a judicial bypass proceeding? Although the
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether court-
appointed counsel is constitutionally required in a bypass case,'83
many states require or permit trial judges to appoint a lawyer-
at the government's expense-to represent the minor. As an
initial matter, a Catholic lawyer in such a state should request
his local trial court not to appoint him to bypass cases.
In general, a lawyer has an ethical obligation under Model
Rule 6.2 to accept court appointments.8 4 However, Model Rule
6.2 contains a very important exception. A lawyer is permitted to
seek a withdrawal if "the client or the cause is so repugnant to
the lawyer as to be likely to impair the client-lawyer relationship
or the lawyer's ability to represent the client." '85  Little doubt
exists that a Catholic lawyer would be justified in seeking court
permission to withdraw from a judicial bypass case on the
grounds espoused in this article. 86
183 See Danne, Jr., supra note 5, §§ 19(a)-(b), at 146-49 (discussing cases which
have held that appointment of counsel was a prerequisite to a valid judicial bypass
statute, as well as cases which have held the opposite).
84 See MODEL RULES, supra note 163, R. 6.2 ("A lawyer shall not seek to avoid
appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except for good cause[.]").
185 Id.
186 See Ind. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Pearson, 716 F.2d 1127, 1137 (7th
Cir. 1983) (stating "we would certainly expect an attorney who held such beliefs
[that abortion is immoral] not to accept a court appointment"); Collett, supra note
162, at 664-65; Vischer, supra note 144, at 24.
In a formal ethics opinion, the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility
was called upon to answer an inquiry from a "devout -Catholic" who routinely
practices in juvenile court and had been appointed to represent minors seeking
judicial bypasses. See Bd. of Prof l Responsibility of the Supreme Court of Tenn.,
Formal Ethics Op. 96-F-140, at 1, 3-4 (1996). This troubling legal ethics opinion has
raised concerns about whether a Catholic lawyer could, in fact, refuse an
appointment or withdraw from such a case. See id. The Board opined that appointed
counsel could not withdraw from a case except for "compelling reasons." Id. at 3.
"Compelling reasons," the Board held, do not include "the repugnance of the subject
matter of the proceeding, the identity or position of a person involved in the case, . ..
or the belief of the lawyer regarding the merits of the civil case." Id. at 3-4. The
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Board stated that the proper course was for the attorney to present a motion to
withdraw and present evidence of inability to represent his client before the
tribunal. See id. at 4-5. Still, the Board expressed pessimism that a court would
permit withdrawal, analogizing the representation to that of an unpopular
defendant. Id. at 4. Ethics Opinion 96-F-140 has been criticized as a "[c]orrupt
[v]ision of [l]awyers as [m]outhpieces" that fails to take into account the relevant
provisions of Rule 6.2. See Collett, supra note 162, at 640, 644-45.
